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Parental Parity: Intentional Parenthood's
Promise
MELANIE

B. JACOBSt

INTRODUCTION

Twenty-first century parentage requires a new approach
to establishment of the legal parent-child relationship. The
heteronormative idealization of a married mother and father
for each child (to whom the child is biologically related) does
not represent the reality of a growing number of American
families. Parentage establishment has historically relied on
status: birth mother, genetic parent, or the marital
presumption
("status-based parentage"). Status-based
parentage, in turn, is based on the nuclear ideal of one
married mother and father for each child. As such, it is ill
equipped to determine parentage for nontraditional
families-those that do not model the nuclear family of a
married mother and father and/or those that are formed
through Assisted Reproductive Technologies ("ART").
Moreover, status-based parentage perpetuates the dual
system of family law-one system for the poor and one for the
wealthy-and unfairly imposes traditional, middle-class
norms and morals.
For more than a decade, my scholarship has challenged
the applicability of status-based parentage in the nont
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nuclear family context and has, instead, advocated for
broader use of both the intentional and functional
parenthood doctrines. Intentional parenthood (choosing and
(often) planning to be a parent) has an advantage over
functional parenthood (undertaking traditional parental
duties), in that the intentional parenthood doctrine permits
at-birth parentage determinations, whereas functional
parenthood requires an analysis at some point after a child's
birth.' Reflecting on my previous work and the works of
others, this Article suggests elimination of status-based
parentage at birth. Instead, legislatures should consider
intentional parenthood as the default, at-birth parentage
establishment model. I have written this Article to outline
why status-based parentage is outmoded in the twenty-first
century and why an intentional parentage model is
preferable. In future work, I will continue to develop
arguments in favor of intentional parenthood and the
specifics for implementation. Intentional parenthood is a
superior parentage establishment doctrine because it
accurately identifies the adults who wish to voluntarily
assume parental responsibilities and obligations for a child.2
Unlike status-based parentage, which is both over and
under-inclusive in its application, intentional parenthood
appropriately captures the range of potential parents for
each child.
Most importantly, intentional parenthood's promise is
greater parental parity: the doctrine's neutrality prevents
1. Both intentional and functional parenthood will continue to play an everincreasing and important role in parentage establishment in the twenty-first
century. For purposes of this Article, I am focusing on at-birth parentage
determinations and thus place greater emphasis on intentional parenthood.
2. It might be that neither genetic parent wishes to parent the child, in which
case the genetic parents can confirm this through a relinquishment of parental
rights, and the child can be placed for adoption. It is possible that a greater
number of children will be available for adoption at birth, although I do not think
that is a likely outcome. There is a greater likelihood that there may be
disagreement among adults about which has/have the requisite intent to parent
and whether more than one parent can successfully co-parent with another. If the
intentional parenthood model is adopted, a process for resolving potential
disputes will need to be included. Although "status" has been suggested for use in
that process, a real concern is reliance on status as a tie-breaker would negate
the utility of the intentional parentage model.
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inherent discrimination based on income, class, gender,
sexual orientation, or marital status. Class differences,
increased non-nuclear families, and lessening of social
stigma for children born out of wedlock have greatly
contributed to the emergence of two family law regimes: a
newer "choice-based" regime that relies on private ordering
to determine parentage and the more traditional "statusbased" regime that assigns parental status based on biology
or the marital presumption. Intentional parenthood can
overcome those differences.
In her 1990 seminal work, Reproductive Technology and
Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender
Neutrality, Professor Marjorie Shultz argued for a new
"meta-rule" that makes intent determinative of parenthood
when couples use ART to have children.' Intentional
parenthood, as Shultz describes, encompasses voluntary,
purposeful, and meaningful choice.4 Although Shultz
observed that intent could play a meaningful role in all
parentage establishments, she limited her focus to parentage
establishment within the ART context.' Arguably, the
voluntariness and choice expressed by an individual or
couple in the ART context may differ considerably from
natural conception. Many births are not planned, and, given
restricted access to abortion, it is impossible to suggest that
every woman who carries a baby to term is an "intended
mother" as contemplated in the ART context. Broadening the
applicability of intentional parenthood, though, will reduce
current class and income disparities in parentage
establishment and can empower lower income women in
other ways, such as by eliminating required co-parenthood.
The past two decades have witnessed some judicial
acceptance of intentional parenthood and significant

3. Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based
Parenthood:An Opportunityfor Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 297, 323.
4. See id. at 307-08.
5. Id. at 323-24 ("While I am favorably disposed toward more general
adoption of intent as a determinant of legal parenthood, I restrict this current
proposal to instances where children are brought into being through 'artificial or
assisted reproduction."').
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advocacy for the doctrine by scholars.
Intentional
parenthood represents significant procreative freedom and
choice: intentional parenthood defines who will and will not
have parental rights and responsibilities, regardless of
traditional status-based parentage, such as genetic
connection or marriage. Because of its association with ART,
intentional parenthood has largely been available to people
of greater means and, in turn, that availability perpetuates
class and income disparities in parentage establishment.
Intentional parenthood, for instance, has not played a
role in parentage determinations for poorer people. For those
who are part of the welfare system, for example, the State by
and large dictates parentage establishment and parentage
responsibilities.7 Although single women of means have been
able to establish themselves as the sole legal parent of a child
born from the sperm of a known donor, a single mother who
receives government provided Temporary Assistance to
Needy Families is required by law to assist the state in
establishing paternity for her child or she is at risk of losing
her benefits.' This status-based system is unfair to poor,
nonmarital mothers who are not permitted to exercise the
same procreative autonomy as wealthier, nonmarital
mothers. Moreover, it is unfair to men who engage in
traditional (coital) reproduction with no intent to parent a
child but who, under federal and state law, will be

6. See generally Mary Patricia Byrn & Erica Holzer, Codifying the Intent Test,
41 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 130 (2015); Melanie B. Jacobs, Applying Intent-Based

ParentagePrinciples to Nonlegal Lesbian Coparents, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 433
(2005); Dara E. Purvis, Intended Parentsand the Problem of Perspective, 24 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 210 (2012); Shultz, supranote 3; Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood
by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the Functional Approach to
Parentage,53 HASTINGS L.J. 597 (2002).
7. Melanie B. Jacobs, Intentional Parenthood's Influence: Rethinking
ProcreativeAutonomy and Federal Paternity Establishment Policy, 20 AM. U. J.
GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 489, 497 (2012) [hereinafter Jacobs, Intentional
Parenthood'sInfluence].
8. See Federal Parent Locator Service, 42 U.S.C. § 653 (2012) (requiring that
mothers who receive public assistance cooperate with the state agency charged
with establishing paternity and child support or risk losing a portion of their
benefits); Melanie B. Jacobs, My Two Dads: DisaggregatingBiologicaland Social
Paternity, 38 ARIz. ST. L.J. 809, 824-26 (2006) [hereinafter Jacobs, My Two Dads].
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established as a legal father against their will and be ordered
to pay child support.'
Intentional parenthood as the default framework to
establish all at-birth parent-child relationships has several
advantages. Use of intentional parenthood at birth would:
(1) reduce the growing class and wealth disparities within
parentage establishment; (2) reduce many gender and sexual
orientation inequities that still persist in parentage
establishment; (3) allow for more than two parents, as
appropriate; and (4) prohibit claims to "disestablish"
parentage. It is possible that some parents who would have
parental rights through status-based parentage may no
longer have parental rights under intentional parenthood.
The greater accuracy and neutrality of intentional
parenthood make the doctrine superior to status-based
parentage and should be adopted for all parent-child
relationships. A potential difficulty is determining who may
establish parental rights if more than two or three adults
claim intentional parent status: if the parties agree, the
framework provides rights for them all; if they do not agree,
intentional parentage statutes will need to provide a
mechanism for prioritizing who may establish parental
rights. What follows in the remainder of this Article is an
argument against the continued use of status-based
parentage and a recommendation in favor of using
intentional parenthood, as well as identifying the next steps
necessary to implement this model. 0
I. THE ARRAY (DISARRAY?) OF PARENTAGE DOCTRINES

Parentage law has become unwieldy in recent decades,
and there is no one clear explanation of when a parent-child

9. See generally Jacobs, IntentionalParenthood'sInfluence, supra note 7.
10. The primary purpose of this Article is to argue against continued use of
status-based parentage and to suggest adoption of an intentional parentage
model going forward. Future work will develop the specific steps necessary for
implementation.
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relationship will be recognized." Rather, "it all depends." 2 "It
all depends" can largely be explained by whether a statusbased or choice-based framework applies. Even within the
status-based framework, context and circumstances often
result in differential application of that parentage doctrine,
lending further disarray.I
In most instances, legal parentage is determined through
an individual's status: as genetic parent, birth mother, or
mother's husband. More recently, though, some legal
parentage has been established using intentional and
functional parenthood doctrines.1 4 These doctrines place
greater emphasis on the potential parent's actions in either
bringing forth the conception and birth of the child
(intentional parenthood) and/or the role the potential parent
has assumed in raising the child (functional parenthood). A
status-based parentage regime, by contrast, simplifies who
can and cannot qualify as a parent and thus has the benefit
of ease of application.
Unfortunately, status-based parentage determinations
can be construed as both overly broad and too narrow. For
instance, status-based parentage may involuntarily create
legal parenthood for some nonmarital fathers through
federal paternity policies and yet exclude a non-genetic gay
11. See JOANNA L. GROSSMAN & LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTLE:
LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA 286 (2011).
12. Id. at 304.
Who is a parent? The answer has gotten cloudier over the years. Science
has added new ways to make babies. And society has changed the way it
defines parents and children. Biological and social parenthood compete
for legal recognition. What results is both controversy and
confusion .... So if we ask, "who is a parent?" the answer is, "it all
depends."
13. Heather Kolinsky, The Intended Parent: The Power and ProblemsInherent
in Designating and Determining Intent in the Context of Parental Rights,
119 PENN ST. L. REV. 801, 805-06 (2015) ("Trying to encapsulate the complexities
of legal recognition of parentage is not a simple process. Rather, it often resembles
a mad game . .. where one person's claim to parentage often trumps another's,
only to be reordered based upon changing status and relationships in and among
adults... .").
14. Adoption is another means by which to establish parenthood, but I am
focusing on non-adoptive parentage establishment.
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or lesbian "parent" who wants and intends to parent a child.
default
model
the current status-based
Moreover,
and
perpetuates
wealth
disparities
exacerbates
discrimination against non-nuclear families.
Status-based parentage highlights the socio-economic
differences in parentage establishment and also relies
heavily on the traditional nuclear family paradigm of one
mother and one father. The establishment of a legal parentchild relationship has traditionally included elements of class
and middle-class privilege and norms. As Professor Leslie
Harris has written:

.

The disparate treatment of rights and duties in families based on
the marital status of the parents is very old in Anglo-American
culture and expressed a fundamental class divide. Marital parents
were respectable, and parentage rules upheld their choices about
family formation .... On the other hand, childbearing outside
marriage traditionally was disreputable . ..

The marital presumption-that the husband of a child's
mother is the child's legal father-was a significant bulwark
of English and American common law. Although the majority
of U.S. states now consider the marital presumption
rebuttable, a minority still reveres the presumption's
emphasis on the marital nuclear family.' 6 The marital
presumption privileged marital families and helped reify the
importance of the American nuclear family: one mother and
one father for each child.

15. Leslie Joan Harris, Reforming PaternityLaw to Eliminate Gender, Status,
and Class Inequality, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1295, 1297; see also June Carbone,
Out of the Channel and Into the Swamp: How Family Law Fails in a New Era of
Class Division, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 859, 861 (2011) ("In an era in which marriage

determined family regularity, the law recognized two family types: a privileged
marital family of husband and wife and the children born into the union, and a
much smaller group of single parent families produced by death, divorce, or
'illegitimate' births.") (citing Jacobus tenBroek, California's Dual System of
Family Law, 16 STAN. L. REV. 257 (1964)).

16. Melanie B. Jacobs, Overcoming the Marital Presumption,50 FAM. CT. REV.
289, 290 (2012).
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By contrast, children born to women out of wedlock were

filius nillius and had only one legal parent, their mother." In
the late 1960s and early 1970s, the United States Supreme
Court delivered a series of opinions that demanded greater
parity for marital and nonmarital children." In 1973, in
response to those decisions, the Uniform Parentage Act
("UPA") was promulgated to ensure greater equality between
marital and nonmarital children and, specifically, to ensure
that nonmarital children had an established parent-child
relationship with their father. 9 Relying on a series of
presumptions, including genetic connection and/or holding
oneself out as the child's father, a man could be legally
declared a child's father and, as a result, be required to pay
child support until the child was emancipated.2 0
The effect of the UPA was largely to mimic the nuclear
family by ensuring one mother and one father-with
attendant responsibilities and rights-for each child. In 2000
and 2002, the UPA underwent significant revision, largely to
assist in parentage determinations for children born through
ART, and incorporates intentional parenthood in its more
recent iteration.2 1 For instance, the UPA severs genetic from
legal parentage when gamete donors are used and

17. See Jacobs, My Two Dads, supra note 8, at 822 (discussing the history of
paternity establishment).
18. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (holding that nonmarital
children have the same constitutional entitlement to support as marital children);
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 164 (1972) (holding it violated the
Equal Protection Clause to deny to two children born out of wedlock the same
right to sue under a worker's compensation law as four marital children); Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968) (holding that it violated the Equal Protection
Clause not to permit five children born out of wedlock to seek damages as a result
of the wrongful death of their mother).
19. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT at Prefatory Note (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 296
(Supp. 2006).
20. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201 (b)(1) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 309
(Supp. 2015) which provides multiple bases on which to establish legal
fatherhood, such as adjudication of fatherhood pursuant to judicial proceedings
and reliance on presumptions of paternity, such as residing with the child and
holding oneself out as the father, despite a lack of biological connection.
21. See infra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
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furthermore provides that in a gestational surrogacy, the
birth mother is not a legal parent.2 2
The UPA, though, also incorporates class and socioeconomic bias, by relying on intentional parenthood for
people who can afford to conceive using ART yet still relying
on genetic parenthood for "traditional" reproduction. The
class bias would not be as pronounced but for the fact that
the UPA is directly linked to the Family Support Act of 1988,
which requires that states, on behalf of single mothers who
receive public assistance, file paternity complaints against
the men who allegedly fathered the child, regardless of
whether the father has any interest-or any intent-to
parent.23
Status-based parentage determinations make parentage
establishment more complicated for families that use ART
and for lesbian and gay parents. For instance, if genetic
connection determines parentage, then a sperm donor should
be a legal father. As noted above, the current UPA provides
that a donor is not a legal father; intentional parenthood is
an appropriate means by which to establish parentage for the
non-genetic parent. Intentional parentage is also important
for same-sex couples in which only one member of the couple
may have a genetic connection to the child but the other
partner intends to co-parent. In recent years, intentional
parenthood and functional parenthood determinations have
increased. Both doctrines, but especially the intent doctrine,
rely on choice, purpose, voluntariness, and private ordering.
The
increased use of these
alternate parentage
determination doctrines illuminates the growing inequities
in parentage law by fostering choice and private ordering for
certain communities but proscribing choice and private
ordering for other communities.

22. The UPA provides that "[a] donor is not a parent of a child conceived by
means of assisted reproduction." UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702, 9B U.L.A. 355
(2000). Article 8 governs gestational surrogacy. See infra note 57.
23. See Jacobs, My Two Dads, supra note 8, at 824.
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Status-based Parentage-Maternity

Determining a child's maternity has long been
straightforward, genetically and legally: a child's birth
mother is her legal mother and all states and the UPA
include a provision that so provides.2 4 The UPA further
provides that provisions that apply to determining paternity
also apply to determining maternity, which means that
genetic connection is another basis of maternity
establishment.2 5 As the California Supreme Court noted in
Johnson v. Calvert,26 technology has now made it possible for
two women to each qualify as a legal mother under the UPA:
a gestational, birth mother and a genetic mother may both fit
the criteria for maternity under the UPA. Maternity,
however, is still largely defined through status-based
determinations; as discussed below, some courts, as in
Johnson, have used the intent framework to resolve statusbased conflicts.
The law has long presumed that the genetic and birth
mother was an intended parent: she receives all the rights
and responsibilities of parentage unless she relinquishes
those rights.2 7 Intent for the mother who has a child through
intercourse may often differ from the intent of a mother who
used ART to have a child. The ART mother had a pre-birth
intention; "but-for" her planning, a child would not be born.
A non-ART mother may have become pregnant as a result of
rape, deficient birth control, or lack of access to birth control.
How can we ascribe "intent" to such different scenarios? I
realize that I am oversimplifying the difficult decisions some
women make; if a woman chooses to parent rather than
relinquish her parental rights and place the child for

24. E.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT
(Supp. 2015).

§

201 (a)(1) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 24

25. See Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and One Legal Stranger:
Adjudicating Maternity for Nonbiological Lesbian Coparents, 50 BUFF. L. REV.
341, 351 (2002).
26. 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993). In Johnson, the California Supreme Court
used intent as the tie-breaker in choosing whether the child's gestational or
genetic mother should be the legal mother. Id.
27. Kolinsky, supra note 13, at 808.
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adoption, I am ascribing intent to her for an at-birth
parentage determination.
Inherent, then, within traditional maternity is
intentional parenthood: the intentional act to parent or not
parent. Determining maternity through intent, then, would
not likely cause any change in how often maternity is
established. Intent would merely serve as a more explicit
means by which to establish maternity, rather than the fact
of birth or genetic connection. In this way, traditional statusbased maternity would instead be established through
intent: a woman who achieves pregnancy through
intercourse would be a legal mother so long as she does not
relinquish her parental rights. A gestational surrogate would
not be a legal mother but the intended mother would be.
There should be negligible difference-if at all-in maternity
establishment under an intentional parenthood framework.
B. Status-based Parentage-Paternityby Biology
Determining paternity has been less clear. Historically,
a child born out of wedlock had only one parent, the child's
legal mother: the biological father had no responsibility for
the child and no recognized parental status.2 8 As the state
sought to ensure two parents for each child, determining
paternity was largely a criminal matter in the first half of the
twentieth century.2 9 Then, in the latter half of the twentieth
century, determining paternity became a largely civil matter,
particularly with the promulgation of the UPA. 0
As noted earlier, the promulgation of the UPA became
closely linked with federal paternity establishment policies
largely as a response to women receiving welfare." In 1975,
28. For an overview of paternity law, see Katharine K. Baker, Bargainingor
Biology? The History and Future of Paternity Law and Parental Status,
14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 6-7 (2004); Jacobs, My Two Dads, supra note 8,
at 816.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. For a discussion of the relationship between paternity law and federal
policies concerning child support enforcement, see Jacobs, My Two Dads, supra
note 8, at 822-26.
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Congress enacted the federal Office of Child Support
Enforcement and the relationship between paternity
establishment and welfare became stronger.3 2 In 1988, the
Family Support Act established performance goals for all
states regarding paternity establishment and linked those
goals to federal funding." The relationship between paternity
establishment and welfare became even tighter after welfare
reform in 1996. Biologically based paternity establishment is
inextricably linked to government efforts to reduce welfare
and promote child support enforcement. As other scholars
have noted, the efficacy of these policies is doubtful, but their
influence is significant.3 4
The heightened reliance on biology to assign parental
status for men is not always fair, in that some men do not
intend to parent, and some women may not choose for a
biological father to co-parent.5 Although protecting children
and ensuring their well-being is an important public policy
goal, legislatures and courts alike recognize that some
women will choose to be single parents. In fact, despite their
reticence about a child having only one parent, courts have
upheld the constitutionality of statutes that permit a woman
to be the sole legal parent of her child even if she uses a
known sperm donor.3 6 As I have argued in previous writings,
32. Id. at 824.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Leslie Joan Harris, Reconsidering the Criteria for Legal
Fatherhood, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 461, 476-77; Daniel L. Hatcher, Child Support
Harming Children: Subordinating the Best Interests of Children to the Fiscal
Interests of the State, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1029, 1030-31 (2007); Laura Oren,
The Paradoxof Unmarried Fathers and the Constitution:Biology 'Plus'Defines
Relationships; Biology Alone Safeguards the Public Fisc, 11 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 47, 99-100.
35. And, as I have observed in previous writings, biological fatherhood coupled
with intent may not result in legal fatherhood if the child's mother is married. See
Jacobs, My Two Dads, supranote 8, at 810.
36. See In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025,1038-41 (Kan. 2007) (upholding a Kansas
statute that bars a sperm donor from parental status in the absence of a
preconception written agreement and further determining that a known sperm
donor was unable to establish paternity because he had not executed such an
agreement); Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236, 1244-48 (Pa. 2007) (holding
that a woman who used sperm from a known donor with the understanding that
the donor would have no parental rights could not sue to establish the donor's
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the current status-based regime raises an important fairness
question by imposing fatherhood (and the two-parent
paradigm) in some cases and yet permitting single
motherhood in others."
Status-based paternity also illustrates how parentage
law attempts to foster proper social norms. An unmarried
father who does not establish his fatherhood is often referred
to as a "deadbeat dad" and the implication that he has
shirked his responsibilities is clear. By imposing fatherhood
on nonmarital fathers, the law seeks to "punish" bad
behavior and force men to assume parental responsibility."
Yet, these policies have largely backfired and the
"assumption of the risk" approach to paternity often, in fact,
is harmful to children. Relying on voluntariness-rather
than status-will provide greater procreative autonomy to
fathers and mothers without harming children.
C.

Status-basedParentage-Paternitythrough the Marital
Presumption

The marital presumption presumes that a child's legal
father is the husband of the child's mother. 9 All U.S.
jurisdictions maintain the marital presumption, to varying
degrees. In a few jurisdictions, the presumption has more
"bite" and it is nearly impossible for a child's alleged
biological father to challenge the presumption while in other
jurisdictions, biological fathers have greater access to
paternity five years after giving birth to twins). The court in Fergusonemphasized
the right of a woman to be able to use sperm from a known donor to establish
single motherhood as she could use the sperm of an anonymous donor. 940 A.2d
at 1244-48.
37. See Jacobs, Intentional Parenthood's Influence, supra note 7, at 500-01;
Jacobs, My Two Dads, supranote 8, at 812-13; see also Lisa Lucile Owens, Coerced
Parenthoodas Family Policy, 5 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (2014).
38. Owens, supra note 37, at 9-10 (discussing that current parentage policy
"reflects the assumptions regarding coerced fatherhood. It assumes that men
should and must be compelled to stand up to their parental 'obligations' that have
resulted with or without their intention or consent").
39. Melanie B. Jacobs, When Daddy Doesn't Want to Be Daddy Anymore: An
Argument Against Paternity Fraud Claims, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 193, 206
(2004).
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standing. 40 The marital presumption serves a useful purpose:
like other status-based parentage determinations, it has ease
of application .41 And, in the majority of instances, a mother's
husband is, indeed, the child's biological father. Also, the
presumption exists to foster family harmony and unity. But,
as judges have articulated, if, in fact, a biological father seeks
to rebut the marital presumption, then marital unity and
family harmony have already been significantly disrupted.4 2
The marital presumption is important because it
privileges two parent, two gender families. 43 The Supreme
Court upheld the importance of the marital presumption as
recently as 1989 in the well-known case of Michael H. v.
Gerald D.44 In the case, a biological father, with whom the
mother had resided after she left the marital home, tried to
establish visitation with his biological daughter.4 5 Writing for
a plurality of the Court, Justice Scalia rejected the biological
father's claim and affirmed the importance of the marital
presumption to American family law. Relying mostly on
glorifications of the American nuclear family, Justice Scalia
made clear his disdain for the biological interloper who
disrupted the family.46 In dissent, Justice Brennan was
sharply critical of the plurality's rhapsodizing of the nuclear
40. Jacobs, supra note 16, at 289-90.
41. Id. at 290 (observing that the marital presumption fosters efficiency as well
as nuclear family integrity).
42. As noted by a Michigan Supreme Court justice in a case involving whether
a biological father who had an affair with the child's mother and voluntarily held
himself out as the child's father had standing to challenge the marital
presumption, "[i]t is surely a bit late to talk of preserving the 'sanctity' of the
marital family by the time a situation like the one alleged in this case has arisen."
Girard v. Wagenmaker, 470 N.W.2d 372, 389 (Mich. 1991) (Cavanagh, J.,
dissenting).
43. For a more comprehensive review of the marital presumption, see generally
Theresa Glennon, Somebody's Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital
Presumptionof Paternity, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 547 (2000).
44. 491 U.S.110, 122 (1989).
45. See id. at 111-12.
46. Justice Scalia wrote that the liberty interest that exists due to biological
fatherhood plus an established parental relationship rest upon "the historic
respect-indeed, sanctity would not be too strong a term-traditionally accorded
to the relationships that develop within the unitary family." Id. at 123.
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family and wrote that, "[t]he plurality's exclusive rather than
inclusive definition of 'unitary family' is out of step" and "out
of tune."47
The marital presumption is not the bulwark it once was,
though. Following the decision in Michael H., the
presumption is rebuttable in the majority of U.S.
jurisdictions. As with status-based biological paternity, the
marital presumption includes a morality component: a
biological father interloper has a lesser moral claim to
parentage than a married husband who asserts his parental
rights, despite not having a biological connection with the
child. The law rewards good behavior (marriage) and
punishes bad behavior (non-marital sex and child-rearing).
Intentional parenthood is morality-neutral and will
eliminate parentage distinctions based on "good" or "bad"
behavior. And, if both the marital and biological father wish
to assert parental rights, it is possible under an intentional
parentage framework.
D. Intent-based Parentage
Procreative autonomy includes the use of ART;
individuals should have the right to use various ART
procedures without government interference.4 8 A doctrine
built on the right to be free from coerced sterilization, 49 to
have unfettered access to contraception,s 0 and a right to legal
abortion,"1 is flexible enough to embrace the further right to

47. Id. at 145 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
48. See Melanie B. Jacobs, Procreation Through ART Why the Adoption
Process Should Not Apply, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 399 (2006).
49. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that
mandatory sterilization of one convicted of stealing chickens and armed robbery
was unconstitutional because it violated equal protection).
50. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.").
51. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (holding that a ban on abortion
unconstitutionally infringed on a woman's right of privacy).
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choose how to form your family. Choice and intent have
similar meanings; most significantly, both imply purpose.
"At the most general level, procreative liberty is the
freedom either to have children or to avoid having them."S 2
Inherent within a definition of procreative liberty that
embraces the freedom to have children or not is the concept
of intent: does a person intend to have a child or intend not
to have a child? Arguably, individuals who choose to have
children using ART enjoy greater procreational liberty than
individuals who have children as a result of sexual
intercourse: they have the ability to choose their genetic and
legal roles, whereas individuals who engage in coital
reproduction are not able to exercise the same degree of
choice. The use of ART heightens the tension between
allowing some individuals to renounce legal parentage, even
though they are genetic parents, and requiring other
individuals to be legal parents, regardless of their intent or
choice to be a parent (or to engage in typical parental
behaviors).
1. Affirmative Intent-Intent to be a Parent
Although there is no "one size fits all" methodology by
which parentage is established when ART is used, intent has
garnered judicial support and is heavily incorporated in the
UPA and the American Law Institute Principles of
Dissolution. For instance, the UPA in its section governing
gestational surrogacy specifically refers to "intended
parents"" and, furthermore, the UPA has a section
pertaining to gamete donors in which it affirms that a gamete
donor, "is not a parent of a child conceived by means of
assisted reproduction."5 4 Similarly, the ALI in its definition
of a parent by estoppel focuses on the agreement of the

52. JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 22 (1994).

53. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT

§ 801 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 87-88 (Supp. 2015).

54. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 355 (2001).
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parties to co-parent a child," incorporating the purposeful
choice articulated by Professor Shultz.
The first judicial instance of using intentional
parenthood is in Johnson v. Calvert, wherein the court was
required to determine which mother-the gestational and
birth mother or the genetic mother-was the child's legal
mother.5 6 Relying heavily on Shultz's intentional parenthood
article, the court used intent as a "tie-breaker" and concluded
that because the genetic mother intended, along with her
husband (the sperm donor), to parent the child, she should be
declared the legal mother."

55. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03(1) (AM. LAw. INST.

DISSOLUTION:

ANALYSIS

AND

2002). A legal parent is an
individual who is defined as a parent under other state law. Id. § 2.03 (1)(a).
A parent by estoppel is an individual who, though not a legal parent, (i)
is obligated to pay for child support under Chapter 3; or (ii) lived with
the child for at least two years and (A) over that period had a reasonable
good-faith belief that he was the child's biological father, based on
marriage to the mother or on the actions or representations of the
mother, and fully accepted parental responsibilities consistent with that
belief, and (B) . . thereafter ... continued to make reasonable, goodfaith efforts to accept responsibilities as the child's father, [even if that
belief no longer existed;] or (iii) lived with the child since the child's birth,
holding out and accepting full and permanent responsibilities as [a]
parent, as part of a prior co-parenting agreement with the child's legal
parent (or, if there are two legal parents, both parents) to raise a child
together each with full parental rights and responsibilities, when the
court finds that recognition . . . as a parent is in the child's best interests;
or (iv) lived with the child for at least two years, holding out and
accepting full and permanent responsibilities as a parent, pursuant to
an agreement with the child's parent (or, if there are two legal parents,
both parents), when the court finds that recognition . . . as a parent is in
the child's best interests.
Id. § 2.03(1)(b).
56. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 778 (Cal. 1993).
57. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782-83 ("Professor Shultz observes that recent
developments in the field of reproductive technology 'dramatically extend
affirmative intentionality. ... Steps can be taken to bring into being a child who
would not otherwise have existed' ..... Within the context of artificial
reproductive techniques,' Professor Shultz argues, 'intentions that are voluntarily
chosen, deliberate, express and bargained-for ought presumptively to determine
legal parenthood."') (citations omitted).
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Intentional parenthood was more explicitly embraced
and applied by a California appellate court in Buzzancea v.
Buzzanca.8 In a case that involved a married couple, egg
donor, sperm donor, and gestational surrogate, the court held
that the two spouses were the child's legal parents because
they intended to be. 9 Essentially, "but for" the intentions of
the married couple, the child would not exist; that is, because
individuals intended to create a child, through use of other
people's gametes, IVF, and/or surrogacy, those individuals
should be recognized as the resulting child's legal parents.6 0
The Buzzanca court found that intentional parents who rely
on ART to have a child should have their procreative choices
protected like other parents.6 1
The UPA emphasizes intent rather than biology in
numerous provisions in Articles 7 and 8,62 both of which
address parentage when ART is used. 63 For example, section
706 specifically addresses how parentage will be determined
in the event of the parties' divorce or one party's withdrawal
of consent. Subsection (a) provides that unless a former
spouse specifically consented that if ART occurs after divorce
s/he will be the parent, the default position is that the former
58. Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 280, 288.
61. Id. at 280.
62. Articles 7 and 8 specifically apply to ART. The prefatory note to Article 7
explains, in part:
During the last thirty years, medical science has developed a wide array
of assisted reproductive technology . . . which have enabled childless
individuals and couples to become parents. Thousands of children are
born in the United States each year as the result of ART.... [I]t is
necessary for the new Act to clarity definitively the parentage of a child
born under these circumstances.
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 7 cmt. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 78 (Supp. 2015).

Article 8 specifically addresses the issue of gestational agreements, permitting
the use of gestational agreements and providing a framework for enforcing the
agreements. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 8 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 86-95 (Supp.
2015).
63. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 706 cmt. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 84 (Supp.
2015) (declaring that "intention, rather than biology, is the controlling factor"
regarding liability in parentage following divorce or withdrawal of consent).
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spouse is not the parent of the resulting child." The comment
further explains,
a child born through assisted reproduction accomplished after
consent has been voided by divorce or withdrawn in a record will
have a legal mother under § 201 (a)(1). However, the child will have
a genetic father, but not a legal father. In this instance, intention,
rather than biology, is the controlling factor.65

I remind the reader this is quite different from the law's
approach to determining a father for a child born out of
wedlock to a mother receiving governmental assistance.

Intent also governs parentage determinations when a child
is born as a result of a gestational surrogacy. Article 8 of the
UPA permits a court to validate and approve a gestational
surrogacy agreement and confirm parentage in the intended
parents.6 6

2.

Negative Intent-Intent Not to be a Parent

Intent plays a significant role in the right not to parent
as well. Certainly, the Supreme Court's protection of the
right to use contraception represents intent not to become a

64. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 706(a) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 83 (Supp. 2015)
("If a marriage is dissolved before placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos, the
former spouse is not a parent of the resulting child unless the former spouse
consented in a record that if assisted reproduction were to occur after a divorce,
the former spouse would be a parent of the child.").
65. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT
2015).

§ 706 cmt. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 83-84 (Supp.

66. UPA § 801 authorizes gestational agreements for married or unmarried
couples. The provision provides, in part:
(a) A prospective gestational mother, her husband if she is married, a
donor or the donors, and the intended parents may enter into a written
agreement providing that:
(2) the prospective gestational mother ... and the donors relinquish all
rights and duties as the parents of a child conceived through assisted
reproduction; and
(3) the intended parents become the parents of the child.
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801(a) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 87-88 (Supp. 2015).
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parent. 6 7 Similarly, a right of abortion represents the right
not to parent. In the ART context, there are many examples
of intent not to procreate, most explicitly seen in the frozen
embryo dispute cases. For example, most courts deciding the
issue of whether a woman may implant frozen embryos
without the consent of her husband or ex-husband have held
that embryos cannot be implanted without the consent of
both partners, in large part because no court wants to impose
unwanted parenthood.68 As the Massachusetts Supreme

Judicial Court held in A.Z. v. B.Z.:
We derive from existing State laws and judicial precedent a public
policy in this Commonwealth that individuals shall not be
compelled to enter into intimate family relationships, and that the
law shall not be used as a mechanism for forcing such relationships
when they are not desired. This policy is grounded in the notion
that respect for liberty and privacy requires that individuals be
accorded the freedom to decide whether to enter into a family
relationship. 69

The foregoing discussion highlights that people who use
ART to have a child or children have greater procreative
freedom and choice. As discussed below, the inaccessibility of
ART for most people, along with the link between biological
paternity and child support, creates a significant schism in
how parentage is established. Intentional parenthood would
create parity among all parents, regardless of the use of ART
or traditional reproduction and regardless of income.

67. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.

438, 452-53 (1972)

("To say that

contraceptives are immoral as such, and are to be forbidden to unmarried persons
who will nevertheless persist in having intercourse, means that such persons
must risk for themselves an unwanted pregnancy, for the child, illegitimacy, and
for society, a possible obligation of support. Such a view of morality is not only the
very mirror image of sensible legislation; we consider that it conflicts with
fundamental human rights. In the absence of demonstrated harm, we hold it is
beyond the competency of the state.") (quoting Baird v. Eisenstadt, 429 F.2d 1398,
1402 (1st Cir. 1970)).
68. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992) (finding that an exhusband's right not to procreate outweighed the ex-wife's interest in donating
embryos for implantation by another couple).
69. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051,1059 (Mass. 2000).
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II. RICH PARENT, POOR PARENT

The increased use of intentional parenthood-and
corresponding private ordering-for some families but not
others, perpetuates the dual system of family law. As early
as the 1960s, Jacobus tenBroek identified a dual system of
family law: "[o]ne is for underprivileged and deprived
families; the other for the more comfortable and fortunate.""
More recently, Professor Jill Hasday has observed that
welfare laws structure "familial rights and responsibilities in
poor families in many ways that are directly contrary to the
law's regulation of wealthier households."" That greater
wealth provides greater procreative freedom is not new:
access to private doctors gave women of means access both to
contraception and to abortion before abortion was legalized
in 1973.72 The past few decades, however, have seen a
growing schism between the "haves" and "have-nots." 3

"[The] divisions between the family law of rich and poor,
private and public, voluntary and involuntary family
associations
have been the subject of extensive
commentary."74 I do not seek to reproduce that commentary
here, but refer to it to highlight the disparity between those
70. Jacobus tenBroek, California'sDual System of Family Law: Its Origin,
Development, and Present Status Part I, 16 STAN. L. REV. 257, 257-58 (1964).
71. Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 832
(2004).

72. See Mark A. Graber, The Ghost of Abortion Past: Pre-Roe Abortion Law in
Action, 1 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 309, 311-12 (1994).
73. According to the Centers for Disease Control, over 1.5% of all infants born
in the United States each year are conceived using ART. Saswati Sunderam et

al., Assisted Reproductive Technology Surveillance-United States, 2011, CDC
(Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss6310al.htm.
While not all ARTs are expensive-at home, assisted insemination with the
sperm of a known donor may not cost anything, for example-many reproductive
technologies cost thousands to tens of thousands of dollars. The cost of IVF in the
United States, for example, is particularly expensive. Costs vary worldwide, from
approximately $2000 in Russia to more than $12,000 per cycle in the United
States. JUDITH DAAR, REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW 175 (2d ed.)

(discussing fertility tourism and the high cost of IVF in the Unites States).
74. June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, The Triple System of Family Law, 2013
MICH. ST. L. REV. 1185, 1188 n.16 (providing citations to nearly a dozen articles
exploring the inequities in family law).
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individuals who have more freedom to exercise legal choices
about parentage than those individuals for whom parentage
establishment is linked to receipt of public benefits and,
further, for whom parentage may create unwanted legal
relationships.7 5
Paternity law is seemingly class-neutral: the purpose of
paternity statutes is to determine a legal father for a child
born out of wedlock. Paternity policy, though, is largely
fueled by its link to the welfare system, and determining a
legal father has become much more about establishing a child
support order than a meaningful parental relationship. As
noted above, status-based parentage contains both forced
"opt-in" elements and forced "opt-out" (by not meeting the
status criteria). While it is likely that both mothers and
fathers will "opt-in" to the paternity system to identify and
establish a child's legal father, a single mother who receives
public assistance is required to opt-in to the system. 6 A
woman who receives public assistance and has a child out of
wedlock must identify for the state's IV-D agency the father
of her child and assist in establishing his paternity. 7 Failure
to assist may result in the termination of benefits."
More than half of children born to women under thirty
are born out of wedlock. "Once largely limited to poor women
and minorities, motherhood without marriage has settled
deeply into middle America."" Moreover, within the group of
75. Id. at 1188-89.
76. Although the legislation concerning paternity establishment and
corresponding child support orders includes good cause exceptions which would
permit a woman to "opt-out" of the required paternity process, most states use
narrow definitions of good cause. Daniel L. Hatcher, Don't Forget Dad:Addressing
Women's Poverty by Rethinking Forced and Outdated Child Support Policies,
20 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 775, 783 (2012).
77. Id. at 780.
78. As Professor Hatcher explains, single mothers are not only required to
assist in identifying the absent parent but must also assign back any resulting
child support to the government so that the state can recoup some of the benefits
it pays out. Id.
79. Jason DeParle & Sabrina Tavernise, For Women Under 30, Most Births
Occur Outside Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/02/18/us/for-women-under-30-most-births-occur-outside-marriage.html.
The one group of mothers resisting this trend is college graduates, most of who

2016]1

PARENTAL PARITY

487

single mothers, significant class disparities have emerged.
The emergence of Single Mothers by Choice ("SMC") further
illustrates the growing economic inequality among women in
the United States. SMCs are generally educated, middle
class, and financially secure women who choose to become
pregnant and parent as single mothers. Thus, a Single
Mother of Choice is someone who intends and plans prior to
conception to be a single parent, 0 in contrast with divorced
or widowed mothers who parent alone, as well as single
mothers who bear children out of wedlock as a result of an
unintended pregnancy or within a relationship not leading to
marriage. In some states, SMCs have been able to protect
their legal, single-mother status, and courts have shied away
from establishing a father-child relationship against the
mother's will."'
The disparity in treatment of SMCs and low income
mothers who must participate in paternity proceedings
highlights how greater financial security results in greater
procreative and parental autonomy.8 2 As Professor Daniel
Hatcher highlighted in a recent article, "[c]hoices available to
middle class and wealthy women are stolen from poor
mothers, and dignity stripped from fathers. The long
marry before having children. Id. Professors June Carbone and Naomi Cahn have
written about the new class divide in which the financial and social "rewards" of
marriage are reserved for people with the most education. Carbone & Cahn, supra
note 74, at 1186. Essentially, we have an elite group for whom college, marriage,
and co-parenthood is the norm and the middle and lower classes for whom
marriage is becoming less attainable. Id.; see also Jason DeParle, Two Classes,
Divided by "I Do," N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2012, at Al. The Sunday, front-cover
article was subtitled, Marriage for Richer; Single Motherhood, for Poorer and
discusses recent research highlighting the growing income gap in the United
States which has also created a gap in family formation. Older, better educated
Americans marry later, stay married, and have children within marriage. Single
women with less income and education find themselves in much less stable
relationships.
80. SMC is someone who intends and plans, from the outset, to be a single
mother (contrasted with single mothers generally). See generally SUSAN B. BOYD
ET AL., AUTONOMOUS MOTHERHOOD? A Socio-LEGAL STUDY OF CHOICE AND
CONSTRAINT 172 (2015).
81. See, e.g., In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025 (Kan. 2007) (discussed in footnote
36); Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236 (Pa. 2007) (same).
82. See supranote 65 and accompanying text.

488

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

outdated notions of bastardy acts, when single mothers were
criminalized and forced into court to protect society from the
burden of their illegitimate children, still exist." Intentional
parenthood-choosing to remain a single mother or choosing
an informal relationship with the child's father rather than
pursuing a paternity order-is not available to poor, single
mothers.
The practice of forced paternity has had deleterious
effects on many of the children that the practice was
supposed to benefit. Theoretically, it sounds ideal to ensure
that every child has two legal parents available for emotional
and financial support. In fact, federal policies that have
encouraged voluntary paternity establishment have been
very successful, and many children have benefitted from two
parents who voluntarily undertook the obligations of
parenting together.8 4 Requiring paternity establishment for
all children, however, has not served to alleviate poverty nor
has it served to improve the qualitative relationship between
a child and her "forced" father; rather, some children are
worse off economically and socially because of current federal
paternity establishment policies." As Professor Hatcher
writes, these policies characterize nonmarital fathers "as an
enemy to be pursued"8 6 and "forces poor mothers and fathers
into hostile positions.""
Intentional parentage will eliminate status-based
parentage and, further, will reduce the income, wealth, and
class disparities that inhere in status-based parentage.
Certainly, many birth mothers and biological fathers will be
83. Hatcher, supra note 76, at 776 (footnote omitted).
84. Voluntary Acknowledgements of Parentage ("VAP") allow the child's
mother and father to establish the legal father's paternity at the hospital, birth
center, or courthouse without litigation. See Harris, supra note 15, at 1305.
85. Leslie Joan Harris, Questioning Child Support Enforcement Policy for Poor
Families, 45 FAMILY L.Q. 157, 159 (2011) (reviewing the Fragile Families and
Child Wellbeing Study to conclude that "child support enforcement practices are
actually harmful to many poor, nonmarital children and their custodial mothers,
in some cases reducing economic support from the fathers and disrupting the
fathers' relationships with the children").
86. Hatcher, supra note 76, at 776.
87. Id. at 779.
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legal parents under this approach, but their affirmative
action of ratifying intent to parent, rather than their status,
will create their legal responsibility. Perhaps most
significantly, this model is more accepting of single
parenthood and will not distinguish between wealthier and
poorer single women, nor will different rules apply based on
whether a mother received governmental financial
assistance. Applying intentional parenthood to all parentage
determinations removes class and income distinctions in
parentage establishment and gives all women equal access to
procreative autonomy, not merely those who can afford it."
Recognizing the right of single parenthood for lower
income women has garnered some previous scholarly
support. Professor Karen Czapanskiy has previously
proposed that only a birth mother would be assigned as a
legal parent at birth, and then she could designate a coparent. 9 Professor Czapanskiy's proposal differs from mine,
in that she relies on status-based parentage to establish
maternity as well as to establish a co-parent over the
mother's objection.90 Still, Professor Czapanskiy also
advocates for greater intentionality by lower income women
in establishing paternity for their children.9' Acknowledging
that her proposal may be considered radical, she responded,
"[i]t is radical because it empowers single mothers." 92
Professor Gary Spitko has also argued constitutional
protection for a father-child relationship should depend, in
88. Karen Syma Czapanskiy, To Protect and Defend: Assigning Parental
Rights When Parents are Living in Poverty, 14 Wm. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 943, 959
(2006) (emphasizing that women with sufficient resources may establish their
single motherhood without state intervention imposing a co-parent father
whereas if "the woman is on welfare, the state can force her to sue her sexual
partner for paternity and child support").
89. Id. at 943.
90. Id. at 946 ("Under the proposal, certain people wanting to fill the role of
parental partner may petition to be designated over the mother's objection. The
category includes only the mother's marital or civil union partner, the child's
biological father, and people who provided the mother with substantial material
and nonmaterial support during the mother's pregnancy and after the birth of the
child.").
91. See generally id.
92. Id. at 966.
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part, upon the consent of the mother to the creation of an
additional parent-child relationship.9
Intentional parenthood will not overcome income
inequality, and there are those who argue that increasing
single parenthood creates worse outcomes for children. I
agree that we need to do more to improve outcomes for
children, to ensure better educational and vocational
opportunities. The current system, though, in which we
impose a particular parentage framework in the mere hope
that modeling a nuclear family will yield the same results, is
not working and is not helping children. We can (and should)
devote greater resources to early childhood education, to paid
parental leave, and quality day care-all of which would
improve outcomes for children at all income levels and
especially improve outcomes for low income children. Those
efforts would reap far greater rewards than establishing a
two parent family in name only.
While opponents may argue that it is wrong to deprive a
child of financial support from two parents, an intentional
parenthood approach will likely not worsen the current
status quo and, in fact, may improve the outcomes for some
children. First, many men who are required to pay child
support as a result of a state initiated paternity and support
proceeding cannot afford to pay, nor pay enough, support to
remove children from public assistance.9 4 Second, a woman
93. E. Gary Spitko, The Constitutional Function of Biological Paternity:
Evidence of the Biological Mother's Consent to the Biological Father's CoParentingof Her Child, 48 ARIz. L. REV. 97, 101, 105 (2006).
94. Tonya L. Brito, Fathers Behind Bars: Rethinking Child Support Policy
Toward Low-Income Noncustodial Fathers and Their Families, 15 J. GENDER
RACE & JUST. 617, 619 (2012) (footnotes omitted):
Today, noncustodial parents who live in poverty owe the vast majority of
child support owed in the United States. These parents lack the means
to pay their child support debt, yet they experience the full panoply of
enforcement measures, including civil incarceration for nonpayment of
support. Ironically, low-income noncustodial parents who lack the ability
to pay their child support debts are more likely to face incarceration than
are the more culpable noncustodial parents who have the means to pay
child support but refuse to pay. This is because other routine and less
severe enforcement measures, such as wage garnishment, are effective
in securing support from those with the means to pay.
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who later meets a man who wishes to support her and her
child will have a harder time establishing a legal tie for the
other man if paternity has been established based on
biological fatherhood. Third, and most significant, as
Professor Karen Czapanskiy has observed, "few mothers
would act irrationally when it comes to the emotional and
financial interests of their infants. Therefore, few would
decline to designate [a] parental partner." 95
III. ADDITIONAL BENEFITS OF INTENTIONAL PARENTHOOD

Intentional parenthood has benefits beyond fostering
income and class equality in parentage establishment such
as promoting elimination of gender and sexual orientation
discrimination in parentage establishment. Additionally,
intentional parenthood permits more than two parents and
discourages parentage disestablishment.
A. Intentional ParenthoodCreatesParentalParityfor
Lesbian and Gay Parents
Status-based
parentage
precludes
parenthood
establishment for a nonbiological co-parent. Because statusbased parentage relies on birth or genetic connection, usually
only one member of a gay or lesbian couple can establish his
or her parenthood. I have previously argued in favor of using
intentional parenthood to recognize nonbiological lesbian
(and gay) co-parents. A default intentional parenthood
framework would create greater stability for a child and her

95. Czapanskiy, supra note 88, at 950. In fact, according to the federal Office
of Child Support Enforcement, for the fiscal year 2010, 1.7 million paternities
were established of which 1.1 million were acknowledged in the hospital or
through another paternity acknowledgement. FY201 0 Annual Report to Congress,
OFF. CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT (June 28, 2013), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/
programs/css/resource/fy2010-annual-report. So, roughly 65% of paternities are
established voluntarily. As discussed in the previous Part, men who sign VAPs
are more likely to pay support and to play a role in their child's life. VAPs create
greater parity among all parents and allow poor parents to document their choice
and intent to parent.
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parents. As such, intentional parenthood removes sexual
orientation discrimination from parentage establishment.
Intentional parenthood would allow easier parentage
determination for same-sex couples, both in and out of
marriage. The Supreme Court's 2015 marriage equality
decision now permits marriage between members of the same
sex in all U.S. jurisdictions. 9 6 The impact of same-sex
marriage in parentage establishment is not fully clear. While
some courts interpret the marital presumption to apply to
same-sex partners, 97 other courts have held that because the
presumption assumes biological parentage, it cannot apply to
same-sex couples. 98 Furthermore, many lesbian and gay
couples, like straight couples, may choose not to marry, and
many statutes defining parental rights with the use of
assisted reproductive technologies apply only to married
couples. 9 9 So, intentional parenthood would greatly simplify

parentage determinations for many gay and lesbian parents
and provide protection for them and their child(ren).
B. IntentionalParenthoodAllows More Than Two Parents
Intentional parenthood permits recognition of more than
two parents at birth. The doctrine will better reflect the
reality of some American families and provide security and
stability for the child and adults alike by clarifying at birth
the adults with parental rights and responsibilities. In
96. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607-08 (2015).
97. Wendy G-M. v. Erin G-M., 985 N.Y.S.2d 845, 861 (Sup. Ct. 2014) (holding
that the marital presumption applies to the nonbiological lesbian co-parent).
98. See Arthur S. Leonard, Even with Marriage Equality, Parental Status
Conflicts Persist, GAY CiTY NEWS (may 28, 2015), http://gaycitynews.nyc/evenmarriage-equality-parental-status-conflicts-persist.
In the article, Professor
Arthur Leonard reviews trial court decisions from several states which differ in
their approach to the application of the marital presumption for same-sex
partners.

99. See Application for Direct Appellate Review of Plaintiff-Appellant
Partanen, Partanen v. Gallagher, No. DAR App. Ct. No. 2015-P-1510 (Mass.
Nov. 24, 2015). In this case pending before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court, a nonbiological, unmarried lesbian partner is challenging a trial court
order dismissing her parentage claim. Id. The trial court determined she did not
have standing under Massachusetts' assisted reproduction statutes, which only
provide protection to married couples. Id.
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certain situations, recognizing the legal rights of more than
two parents may benefit a child.'00 For example, it may
benefit a child to have three legally recognized parents when
a lesbian couple wants a known sperm donor to play a
parental role in their child's life or a family in which a marital
father and biological father both want to support (financially
and emotionally) a child.
Several jurisdictions have recognized legal rights for
more than two parents. Most notably, in 2013, the California
legislature enacted legislation that allows a child to have
more than two legal parents if it would serve the best
0 California Family Code Section
interests of the child.o'
7612(c) provides, "[i]n an appropriate action, a court may find
that more than two persons with a claim to parentage under
this division are parents if the court finds that recognizing
only two parents would be detrimental to the child." 0 2
California is not the first state to permit recognition of
more than two parents. Since 1989, Louisiana has permitted
dual paternity and has amended its statute to allow a
biological father to sue for paternal rights within a year of a
child's birth, even if the child has a presumed marital

100. See Melanie B. Jacobs, Why Just Two? Disaggregating Traditional
ParentalRights and Responsibilities to Recognize Multiple Parents, 9 J.L. & FAM.
STUD. 309 (2007) (arguing in favor of permitting more than two parents when in
a child's best interests); see also Susan Frelich Appleton, Parents by the Numbers,
37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11 (2008).
101. Joanna L. Grossman, CaliforniaAllows Children to Have More Than Two
Legal Parents, JUSTIA: VERDICT (Oct. 15, 2013), https://verdict.justia.com/2013/10/
15/california-allows-children-two-legal-parents.
102. CAL. FAM. CODE
provides:

§

7612(c) (West Supp. 2016). The rest of the section

In determining detriment to the child, the court shall consider all
relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the harm of removing the
child from a stable placement with a parent who has fulfilled the child's
physical needs and the child's psychological needs for care and affection,
and who has assumed that role for a substantial period of time. A finding
of detriment to the child does not require a finding of unfitness of any of
the parents or persons with a claim to parentage.
Id.
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father. 03 Other states have similarly recognized more than
two parents for a child. In Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, a
Pennsylvania court held that a biological lesbian mother, her
partner, and the children's known sperm donor all had
parental rights and obligations for the children.'0
In February 2013, a Florida judge ruled that a child's
birth certificate could list two mothers and a father. 0 5 And,
in 2007, the Ontario Court of Appeals similarly ruled that a
child could have three legal parents. In A.(A.) v. B.(B.), the
court recognized the parental rights of the child's biological
mother and father and the biological mother's lesbian
partner.1 06 While I am not suggesting that all children should
have more than two parents, courts and legislatures have
taken note of the fact that it may be in a child's best interests
to recognize more than two parents. Intentional parenthood
is the most straightforward means by which to do so. 0
103. See Jacobs, My Two Dads, supranote 8, at 853-54 (reviewing the Louisiana
statute and cases).
104. 923 A.2d 473, 482 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007). In overturning the trial court's
holding that the biological father had no support obligation, the appellate court
wrote:
In the trial court's view the interjection of a third person in the
traditional support scenario would create an untenable situation, never
having been anticipated by Pennsylvania law. We are not convinced that
the calculus of support arrangements cannot be reformulated, for
instance, applying to the guidelines amount set for Appellant fractional
shares to incorporate the contribution of another obligee.
Id.
105. Martha Neil, 3-Parent Birth Certificate is Ok'd by Judge, ABA J. (Feb. 8,
2013, 3:33 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/judge-oks_3-parentbirth certificatesays. A female couple, lawfully married in Connecticut but
living in Florida, used the sperm of a known donor. Id. The parties orally agreed
that all would maintain a parental relationship and the judge agreed. Id.
106. A. (A.) v. B. (B.) (2007) 83 O.R. 3d 561, 574 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (agreeing with
the parties that adoption by the nonbiological lesbian mother would be to the
detriment of the child who would thus lose a legal tie to his biological father, the
court used its equitable, parens patrie authority to legitimate the rights of all
three parents and foster the child's best interests).
107. I have previously written that recognition of more than two parents does
not necessitate that each parent have the same degree of responsibility for the
child, and it is possible to prioritize parents to make multiple parentage
manageable. Intentional parenthood would permit the "disaggregation" of
parental responsibilities for which I previously argued. Jacobs, supra note 100, at
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C. Intentional Parenthood Will Prevent Paternity
Disestablishment
Intentional parenthood has another advantage: it
militates against paternity disestablishment. Technology has
not only made it easier to disaggregate legal and genetic
parentage, it has made it much easier to determine genetic
parentage for any child. While biology plays a starring role
in establishing support orders from "deadbeat dads" biology
is also playing a role in the "duped dads" movement.'"0
Pharmacies now sell DNA testing home-kits, and news
articles have chronicled the emotional devastation some men
suffer upon learning they are not a child's biological father.
In response, some state legislatures have enacted legislation
that permits a man who is an established legal father of a
child to disestablish his paternity if he submits proof that he
is not the child's genetic father,' 9 and some states have also
allowed paternity disestablishment by judicial opinion." 0
Although the courts focus on the questionable ethics of the
mother-who did not reveal that another man was the
genetic father-those courts rarely question the ethics of a
man who has long functioned as a father to a child but now
wants no more contact with the child who considers him

339; see also Pamela Laufer-Ukeles & Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Between Function
and Form: Towards a Differentiated Model of Functional Parenthood, 20 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 419, 427 (2013) ("Functional and formal parenthood are distinct
statuses that need to be clearly distinguished and supported for the benefits they
each provide as well as the different limitations involved in each method of
obtaining parenting rights.").
108. I have put both phrases in quotations because I dislike both terms. As
discussed earlier, many men who do not pay child support or pay inadequate child
support do not have the resources with which to pay. Furthermore, as I have
discussed in previous writings, men who form a social bond with a child over five,
ten, or fifteen years should not be considered "duped" for they have enjoyed the
benefits of fatherhood.
109. See Jacobs, supra note 39, at 227-33 (reviewing several state statutes that
permit paternity disestablishment).
110. See id. at 222-27
disestablishment).

(reviewing

state opinions permitting paternity
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"daddy.""' As I have previously argued, biology should not
trump relationships.l1 2
Applying intentional parenthood more broadly will help
reduce the growing "disestablishment" movement. By relying
on a person's affirmative consent, intent will govern
parentage-not genetics or the marital presumption-and
someone who voluntarily undertakes the responsibilities of
parenthood will not be able to change his mind later on."'
Impressing upon parents the gravity of establishing
intentional parenthood may deter some individuals from
signing and accepting responsibilities at the time of a child's
birth; but the intentional parenthood framework should
result in overall better outcomes for children because of the
voluntariness of the undertaking.
CONCLUSION

The intentional parenthood approach prioritizes
voluntariness and choice in parentage establishment. If
broadly adopted, intentional parenthood can eliminate
income, class, marital, gender, and sexual orientation
inequities in parentage establishment. Furthermore,
intentional parenthood simplifies parentage establishment
for gay and lesbian parents; makes it easier to establish more
than two parents; and would greatly diminish claims to
disestablish parentage. To accomplish implementation of the
intentional parenthood model, I propose that in addition to a
birth certificate-which provides indicia of parentage but is
not the legal basis of parentage-all parents must sign an
intentional acknowledgment of parenthood that establishes
the maternity and/or paternity of the child. An intentional
parenthood approach will not require one mother and one
father, nor will it require two parents. Rather, under this
approach, a child will have a minimum of one parent and may
possibly have two, three, or more parents.
Future work will develop a particular implementation
strategy. If states abandon status-based parentage in favor
111. See id.
112. See id. at 233-34; see also Jacobs, My Two Dads, supra note 8, at 837-43.
113. This will require that the signing of a document of intentional parenthood
may not be rescinded except in cases of fraud or duress.
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of intentional parenthood, several technical and important
points need consideration: (1) the document or means to
establish intentional parenthood; (2) the timeframe by which
intentional parenthood must be established; (3) rules
regarding possible rescission of intentional parenthood; and
(4) parenthood establishment at a time much later than that
prescribed for establishing intentional parenthood.
I anticipate using a document similar to the Voluntary
Acknowledgement of Parentage used widely in hospitals to
establish paternity for nonmarital children. A VAP or
something similar could be offered to all parents to establish
intentional parenthood at birth. Like birth certificates, VAPs
are offered in birth records offices and birthing facilities.
Most are signed soon after a child's birth. Rather than
reserving this process for unmarried couples only, I suggest
that a document to establish intentional parenthood be
offered to all parents."'
If intentional parenthood is not established within a
particular period (e.g., six or twelve months), then a showing
in addition to intent should be required before allowing
someone to assume the obligations and benefits of parentage.
So, while intentional parenthood provides the fairest default
mechanism by which to establish parenthood at the time of a
child's birth, the additional layer of functional parenthood
should be used after a period of time, to ensure that the
second (or third) caregiver has demonstrated both the
requisite intent and undertaken parental obligations to earn
the legal parent title. Moreover, by adding a requirement of
functional parenthood analysis to later parentage
determinations, we can prevent too many individuals from
asserting a parentage claim."5

114. In the case of gestational surrogacy, I propose that the intended parents
establish parentage at birth but also still recommend the use of a pre-birth
agreement to clarify the parties' expectations so that the gestational surrogate
could be precluded from signing a parentage form. See Purvis, supra note 6, at
244.
115.

See

PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS

AND

RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2002) (defining parents by estoppel
and de facto parents who may demonstrate through their actions that they have
undertaken the responsibilities of parentage and should be recognized as a
parent).
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Intentional parenthood will enable all parents to exercise
greater choice and autonomy regarding birthing and raising
children. Intentional parenthood will also provide a clear,
consistent means by which to establish parentage for all
children while reducing inequities of class, income, gender,
marital status, and sexual orientation. As such, intentional
parenthood's true promise can be realized: parental parity.

